

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02212 191311Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----079561 191312Z /43

O 191211Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7676  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 2212

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, LE, UN  
SUBJECT: WALDHEIM VISIT: CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN BOUTROS

1. CALLED ON FONMIN BOUTROS AT HIS HOME AT 1730 LOCAL APRIL 18 (TO INDICATE PASS TO WHICH WE HAVE COME, BOUTROS SUBSEQUENTLY DENIED TO PRESS I HAD BEEN THERE). HE HAD FOLLOWING TO SAY ABOUT WALDHEIM VISIT.

2. VISIT HAD BEEN "CLASSIQUE", I.E., NO SURPRISES. HE HAD TOLD WALDHEIM IN CAR ON WAY FROM AIRPORT TO PRESIDENCY NOT TO RAISE CAIRO ACCORD BECAUSE GOL CONSIDERED IT NULL AND VOID. HE HAD "INSISTED" THAT UNIFIL MANDATE SHOULD INCLUDE POSITIONS NORTH OF LITANI. WALDHEIM HAD INDICATED INTEREST IN INCREASING SIZE OF UNIFIL AND HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES OF UN DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL.

3. WALDHEIM HAD SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED WITH ARAFAT QUESTION OF BEAUFORT, ARNUN AND NABATIYAH, SAYING HE WANTED TO POST  
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OBSERVERS AT THOSE PLACES. ARAFAT HAD AGREED (WE WONDER). WALDHEIM HAD ALSO RAISED WITH ARAFAT QUESTION OF PASSAGE OF LEBANESE ARMY TO SOUTH. ARAFAT SAID PLO HAD NO OBJECTION, BUT SOME OF LEBANESE LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN SOUTH LEBANON MIGHT OBJECT BECAUSE THEY REGARDED ARMY AS MARONITE TOOL. THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT TO GENDARMERIE, BUT ARMY WAS DIFFERENT. THIS WAS MANEUVER, OF COURSE, BUT IS HAD RAISED SPECTRE OF CLASH

BETWEEN ARMY AND LEFTISTS, WHICH WOULD BE SERIOUS SETBACK TO ARMY.

4. BOUTROS IMPLIED, BUT DID NOT SAY, THAT ARAFAT'S REMARKS PERSUADED SARKIS, IF HE NEEDED PERSUADING, THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO SEND ARMY TO SOUTH. HE ALSO SAID, HOWEVER, THAT SIILASVUO HAD BECOME VERY LUKEWARM TO IDEA. I ASKED IF THIS WAS BEFORE OR AFTER WALDHEIM-ARAFAT MEETING. BOUTROS SAID IT WAS BEFORE.

5. I ASKED IF THIS EXPLAINED STATEMENT IN MORNING'S PRESS THAT ARMY WAS NOT READY TO GO TO SOUTH. HE SAID ARMY WAS READY. QUESTION WAS ONE OF POLITICAL DECISION. FRANKLY, HE WAS TIRED OF SUBJECT. HE SUGGESTED I DISCUSS IT WITH PRESIDENT. I SAID I WOULD DO SO. WE UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL LEBANESE CONCERNS AND LIMITATIONS, BUT ENTHUSIASM OF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WOULD WANE RAPIDLY IF LEBANON WOULD NOT SEND ITS ARMY SOUTH TO SHARE THE RISKS AND ASSUME TASK OF ASSERTING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. BOUTROS SAID HE WAS ALL FOR SENDING ARMY TO THE SOUTH, BUT INDICATED PRESIDENT WAS AGAINST IT. HE SAID PERHAPS THEY COULD AUGMENT GENDARMERIE PRESENCE. WOULD IT HELP IF THEY SEND 1,000 POLICEMEN SOUTH? (I KNOW FROM MINISTER OF INTERIOR THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE.)

6. WE THEN DISCUSSED QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE CONTINGENT DESCRIBED IN STATE 98231. I HAD ALSO RAISED SAME QUESTION WITH MINISTER OF INTERIOR SALMAN IN MORNING. BOTH OF THEM AGREED IN SECRET

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SAUYING SUCH A FORCE WOULD PERHAPS BE USEFUL IN EVENT ARMY DID NOT<sup>9</sup> SOUTH, BUT THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE HANDLED AS PART OF

UNIFIL, NOT AS SEPARATE POLICE FORCE. IF IT CAME IN LATTER CAPACITY IT WOULD RAISE ALL SORTS OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

7. I SAID 1,000 GENDARMES WOULD BE GREAT, BUT 300 ARMY TROOPS WOULD BE BETTER. GOL NEEDED TO HAVE SYMBOLIC ARMY PRESENCE IN SOUTH. BOUTROS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION VERY WELL AND HE WAS ALL FOR IT, BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO CONVINCE SARKIS.

8. I THEN ASKED IF THEY HAD DISCUSSED QUESTION OF MEETING BETWEEN GEN. KHOURY AND ISRAELIS. HE SAID WALDHEIM HAD RAISED IT. HE THEN CALLED FOR HIS BRIEFCASE AND READ FROM LEBANESE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION. HE HAD TOLD WALDHEIM THAT MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE ONLY WITHIN ILMAC FRAMEWORK AND THEN ASKED WHAT ISRAELIS EXPECTED FROM MEETING. WALDHEIM HAD REPLIED THAT THERE WERE MILITARY QUESTIONS AS WELL AS BASIC PROPOSITIONS TO DISCUSS. URQUHART HAD THEN ASKED SIILASVUO WHAT ISRAELIS HAD IN MIND. SIILASVUO SAID THEY WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO REPLACING GOOD FENCE WITH OPEN BORDER. BOUTROS HAD REPLIED THAT HIS WAS WELL BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND WAS RELATED TO OVER-

ALL SETTLEMENT.

9. MATTER APPARENTLY RESTED THERE. (IF SIILASVUO SPOKE AS ALLEGED AND IF THAT REPRESENTS ISRAELI INTENTIONS, THERE PROBABLY WILL BE NO MEETING. IF ISRAELIS WANT TO DISCUSS MORE LIMITED OBJECTIVES, THAT MAY BE POSSIBLE. IF TEL AVIV CAN PROVIDE US WITH A PROPOSED AGENDA, I WILL PASS IT TO BOUTROS AND WE WILL SEE WHAT DEVELOPS. GOL WILL PERHAPS AGREE TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH MATTERS AS RETURN OF REFUGEES, CONTROL OF INFILTRATION AND MAJOR HADDAD, BUT IS UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO DISCUSS THE GOOD FENCE OR ITS RAMIFICATIONS.)

10. FINALLY, I ASKED IF THEY TALKED ABOUT MAJOR HADDAD. BOUTROS SAID THEY DID AND THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT ONCE THE  
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LEBANESE ARMY ENTERS THE SOUTH, HADDAD AND THE UNITS UNDER HIS COMMMAND CAN BE REINTEGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY.

11. COMMENT. WE WERE BOTH VERY TIRED AND DEPRESSED AND NEITHER OF US WAS UP TO GOING INTO THE MINUTIAE OF THESE EXCHANGES. WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE AUTHORITATIVE WORD FROM JERUSALEM. IN PARTICULAR, BEFORE I TACKLE SARKIS, WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A CLEAR READING ON SIILASVUO'S VIEWS REGARDING LEBANESE ARMY. IF HE IS LUKEWARM AS BOUTROS CLAIMS, I WILL BE IN NO POSITION TO ARGUE WITH SARKIS THAT ARMY MUST MOVE. I AM PLANNING TO ASK TO SEE SARKIS THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 20. PARKER

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